When building large specifications from requirements, the structure of the specification becomes a central problem: the specification language should allow a decomposition that closely reflects the structure of requirements.
Introduction
Large specifications need structure to be manageable. This structure is key to their readability, writability, reusability, and traceability to requirements. The algebraic specification school proposes a strong structuring construct, importation, where an existing specification can be enriched, but not be modified. While developing case studies [14, 15] , we discovered that this structure is often, but not always, adequate:
l It might not match the organization found in requirements, making it difficult to relate specifications to the original requirements.
l It might not reflect the construction process followed by the specifier, leading to difficulties in explaining the specification, and sometimes to large modifications in the specification in response to a small change in requirements.
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l It might hinder reuse, since existing specifications often have to be slightly adapted.
We propose here a complementary structure that allows partial reuse of existing specification modules: the "default" module is used as a template that can be tailored by introducing specific exceptions to suit the needs of the application at hand. To give a meaning to such a combination, we select the models of the exception that are as close as possible to the models of the default. The use of models preserves the level of abstraction found in algebraic specifications: specially, logically equivalent specifications are not distinguished.
This composition is nonmonotonic: by adding exceptions, we may have to retract defaults. Note that nonmonotonicity is already present in the initial approach to algebraic specifications: in the initial model, all terms are distinguished by default, and by adding equalities we may have to retract some of these default inequalities. In the same way that the initial approach can be parameterized by the logic used and the morphisms between models (that are used to select the initial model) [24] , our proposal can be parameterized by the logic and the closeness relation between models, leading us to define default institutions.
To allow the reader to become acquainted progressively with the generality of default institutions, we start with the simplified case of a default D and an exception E, that we note D but E. A propositional logic is first presented informally (Section 3.1.1); it is then generalized to a first variant of predicate logic (Section 3.1.2), but this variant cannot deal with exceptions on equality. A better variant is thus designed, and at the same time we show how it can be abstracted to default institutions (Section 3.2.1). Using default institutions, the general case with several defaults is then presented in Section 4, under the name of reliability graphs. Sound rules for a logic of reliability graphs are presented.
Examples of application (1) SpeciJication construction:
Even when requirements are well understood, the construction of a formal specification is incremental, beginning with a simplified model of the system to be built, while exceptions to this model are introduced at a later stage. For instance, in the specification of the Unix System V file system, the mv command has a simple, orthogonal definition [14, Fig. 51 , but some cases (e.g., moving a directory) must produce an error message instead. These cases are contradicted by further exceptions (e.g., moving a directory onto a file) that must produce more specific error messages.
(2) Requirements elicitation: When integrating requirements from different users, contradictions often occur that are solved through the use of a precedence between requirements [48] . The present scheme can be used to solve simple problems of this type.
(3) SpeciJication of domains involving exceptions:
(a) Grammar: The grammar of most natural languages is presented through general rules later contradicted by special cases, and recursively. For instance, in French, verbs whose infinitive ends in "er" form their third plural of present indicative through the suffix "ent", but verbs in "eler" will use "ellent", except some that use "Glent".
(b) Biological taxonomy: Animals are grouped into classes described by prototypical properties, but many subclasses are defined through exceptions to these properties.
In each case, exceptions could be eliminated in the final specification, at the expense of readability, writability, and traceability.
Institutions
The basic definitions of the algebraic school (who borrowed them from logic and algebra) are recalled below, with an emphasis on structuring concepts. They are independent of the underlying logic. The usual requirements on this logic (called an institution [lo, 241) are introduced as we go along, and will be extended in the next section towards default institutions, by adding a closeness between interpretations that will be used to combine defaults. In fact, as these requirements are rather abstract, most of our efforts will be devoted to their illustration on a simple, yet not trivial, variant of first-order logic that has interesting properties for the specification and implementation of abstract data types. This section first recalls the syntactical and semantical parts of institutions. Institutions can then be used to define generic operations on specifications:
initiality (or freeness) [24] , importation, inclusion, and reachability.
Syntax: modules
A specification is a description, or better a modeling of the reality. This description uses a language. In fact part of this language is chosen by the user; we say that the Example 2.2. Our concrete examples (that show the use of our example institution) borrow their syntax from LPG [2,3], and their graphical notation from Z [52] , where a module is represented by a box with a line dividing the signature from the axioms.
The natural numbers are specified in Fig. 1 as an example of a data structure definition typical of software specification.
(end of 2.2) (end of 2.1)
Semantics: models
The semantics of a module will be defined here as its class of models. From an abstract point of view, we just need a class of interpretations M(2) for each signature, and a satisfaction relation k 5 M(2) x2?(E).
Example 2.3. An algebra A of a signature 2 gives l for each sort s, a set sA (called the carrier of the sort); l for each operator symbol J; a function fA from the carriers of the argument sorts to the carrier of the result sort;
l for each predicate symbol p, a relation pa between the carriers of the argument sorts. In SFOL, we assume that interpretations have an internal signature TEA containing 2:; an interpretation is thus a pair (EA, A), where A a surjective EA-algebra. This definition will later be useful to give a good structure to correspondences (see
Theorem 2).
A valuation V is a function that for each variable yields its value, i.e. a member of the carrier of its sort. We say that V'-, V, if Vx E X,5\{v}, V'(X) = V(X).
The evaluation V, is the function that extends V by assigning to each term of TZA(X) a value (an element of the carrier of its sort) so that V,(f( t,, . . . , t,)) = .L( VA(h), . . . , V,( t,)) for any operator fE EA. For each valuation, there is exactly one evaluation extending it. When no variables are present (X = (3), there is a single ground valuation, which is the empty function. The ground evaluation, denoted e,, is the corresponding evaluation that gives a value to each (internal) ground term. If e, is injective, the algebra is called injective as well; if e, is surjective, the algebra is called surjective; if the restriction of e, to the ground terms of the signature 1 is surjective, the algebra is called term-generated.
Surjective algebras have a special importance in computer science, due to their constructive nature [ 11,571. We follow this tradition and define interpretations of SFOL as surjective algebras. As the signature of the algebra can be larger than the signature of the language, this is not a real restriction, since we can always add constants to represent each element (i.e. form diagram signature [l] ), but it will have its importance when we consider the closeness between interpretations.
An algebra A satisJies a formula 4 for a valuation V, denoted A k v 4, if:
l AI=v+l~ +2 iff Ak"+, and Ak"&;
l Ai=" 14, iff A+"+ is false;
l Al=,tlv, 4 iff AI=",4 for all V'="V.
An algebra A satis$es a formula 4, noted AI= 4, if it satisfies it for all valuations.
(end of 2.3)
A model of a presentation P is an interpretation of the signature of P that satisfies the axioms of l? The semantics of a presentation P is the class of its models, denoted
Mod(P).
Let should induce a translation function Tr, on the language and an opposite forgetful functor .lm on algebras. We say that: l A formula 4 E Z'(Z) entails 4'~ Z'(E), denoted 4 I= b', iff all models of 4 are models of 4'. This induces a category of formulae. l A presentation P entails a formula C#I E Z(IP), denoted P k 4, if all models of P satisfy 4. We also say that C$ is a property of Z?
l A theory is an entailment-closed class of formulae: 4 E T, 4 k I+!J + $ E T.
(Theories equipped with inclusion form yet another category.) Specially, the properties of a presentation form its closure theory Cl(P). Similarly, the theory Cl(2, M) of a model M is the set of its properties:
We define semantic equivalence # as isomorphism in each of these categories.
A model M is reJined by another model N, Mm N, if N has more properties: Cl(I, M) G Cl(E, N). On the other hand, we have assumed (following the tradition of institutions) that interpretations of a given signature form a category. The morphisms between interpretations are usually variants of homomorphisms (see [24] for examples), but we will see in Definition 1 another definition that suits better our purposes. These morphisms naturally define another preorder, and it is instructive to compare the two preorders. The institution is said to be weakly abstract iff M-N whenever 3h : A4 + IV. Intuitively, an institution is weakly abstract if our logic does not allow us to look at more details of our models than the morphisms do. In the usual equational institution [17] , this model has the interesting properties of nojunk and no confusion (see Section 5.4.1). The language designer can construct morphisms to select the model according to his taste. For instance, in partial algebras, Moller [40] and Reichel [45] choose the least defined model. We think that this concept can be improved in two main directions:
l Requiring the existence of a minimum is too rigid. The language is then restricted to Horn clauses, excluding thus disjunction or existential quantification that we consider to be important tools for specification. We will therefore work with minimal models instead (defined in Section 3.3).
l Although institutions allow the language designer to choose his criteria for minimization, the language u.ser (the specifier) has no choice. Here, we will allow the specifier to give an "ideal template", also called a default. The models that are closest to this default will be retained. To reach the abstraction level usual in algebraic specifications, and to avoid any bias given by the concrete syntax of formulae, we would like our formalization to be based on models. A Karnaugh table (Fig. 2) can help us to visualize the models:
Default institutions
in such a table, each entry represents a possible model. Looking at the table, the models we want are the models of E that are closest to a model of D. Here, two such models exist: e, described by B A J A -6 A P (which is S away from d, = B A J A S A P) and e2 described by B A J A TS A TP (which is also S away from BAJASATP).
This institution can easily be formalized: Given two models M and N we can define the closeness between M and N, denoted d(M, IV), as a pair of sets of propositions:
l the first set contains the propositions that are true in M and false in N;
l the second set contains the propositions that are false in M and true in N.
The distances will be compared by componentwise inclusion. Propositional logic equipped with this closeness will be called PL. It is equivalent to the propositional fragment of the default institutions presented in the sequel. Its strong intuitive appeal stems, we think, from the fact that the closeness between models is determined by the difference between their elementary facts. Of course, nothing ensures that real-world facts will correspond to logical facts (propositions), but it is a reasonable starting point. Unlike the usual concept of distance, the closeness used here: Of course, other closenesses are possible:
l To ensure symmetry, we could just take the union of the two components of the pair, so that for instance d(e,, d,) = {S}. In this case, we consider that suppressing or adding a fact amounts to the same change. This closeness is proposed in [56] . This closeness only has a meaning if the carriers of M and N are the same; furthermore, the functions should also be the same in the two models. This example shows that a further generalization of the concept of distance is needed: the closeness, instead of being a total function, might be defined only for some pairs of models (here, models that have the same carriers and functions).
One consequence of this definition is that exceptions on equality cannot be dealt with: for instance, if two constants are requested to be equal in the default and different in the exception, then some carrier or some function has to be different. Even if we convene that equality is not built in, the same problem occurs (this is well known in the study of circumscription, see [ZO] ). This is rather unfortunate as most existing algebraic specifications make heavy use of equality.
The problem of equality
In the framework of algebraic specifications, models with different carriers are usually compared using homomorphisms. Between two models, there may exist several homomorphisms, so that a further generalization will be needed: the closeness may depend not only on the models, but also on the way they are compared. We will thus replace pairs (M, IV) by morphisms h : M + N that may contain supplementary information-typically information about which element in a carrier of one model is the counterpart of a given element in the corresponding carrier of the other model. Partiality is then represented naturally by the absence of morphisms between the two models considered.
In the previous example (FOL= =), the morphisms are equalities. Given an homomorphism h : A + B, the closeness will thus be generalized to a mapping giving for each predicate p : w, the pair
We are led to compare two homomorphisms by using a third one: h : A + B s h':A'+ B' iff 3hA:A+A'; Vp: WE P; V~'E w,:
(Z) and p,(h(a'))) implies (not pAf(hA(d)) and pBS(h'(hA(Z)))).
To simplify notation, we have suppressed the function d, and we use a preorder between morphisms directly. In the special case where the default is of the form A\p:wtP VX : w; lp(X), we obtain equality circumscription [44] . This ordering introduces more problems than it solves: given above simplifies thus to 3 hA : A + A', which will select a model where equality is minimal. We see thus that the use of a homomorphism in the comparison leads to:
l minimizing the equality even when nothing in the specification seems to request it; l considering that some pairs of models might agree strictly better than a model with itself. In the definition of default institution, we will take care to eliminate this counterintuitive behaviour by requesting that identities are always minimum.
(end of 3.1)
Furthermore, this ordering deals somewhat unexpectedly with elements that are not the value of a ground term: Example 3.2. it is common knowledge that one seldom wins in games of chance, so let D = Vx: person; Twins(x).
We are told that Harry played heads and tails with an unknown person: E = 3u : person; u # Harry A (wins(u) v wins(Harry)).
By examining the models of D but E, we can deduce that Harry has lost the game. This unexpected answer disappear when we introduce a name for u (by skolemizing E).
(end of 3.2)
Default institutions
Our examples had a double motivation:
l to show that the treatment of the examples required several generalizations of the concept of distance, and also to show which properties of the distance should be preserved;
l to show that the treatment of exceptions on equality had to be improved, leading to the proposal of SFOL that will be presented in more detail as an example of a default institution.
Morphisms
Our first problem is thus to relate algebras that may be widely different in nature:
for instance, natural numbers, strings of bits, counters of an abacus are all algebras of Nat. We need therefore a way to relate elements of different nature that play a similar role. In fact, classical institutions [lo] already assume morphisms to that end. (end of 3.3)
Ordering
The last problem is to effectively compare morphisms (i.e., pairs of models linked by indications about which elements play similar roles), in order to give a precise meaning to "closest". To that end, we require a preorder G among morphisms.
We require that identity morphisms are minima. Consequently, all of them are equivalent for the ordering, and we convene to note one among them as 0. (1) start from an abstract category 9; such off-the-shelf categories exist for most logics; (2) generalize it keeping the structural part only; (3) choose the comparison preorder such that d = 0 iff d is a morphism of 9. This method has been followed for our example default institutions, except that we have found no abstract category for logics without equality on our shelf.
Example 3.5. In SFOL, the structural part of morphisms relate constants and functions, so that we choose to measure the difference between predicate extensions. We first introduce a concrete representation for that difference. 
. , K,)); (2) total: Vs E S, V(a, b) E -; 3(a', b') E -'; (a, b) zs (a', b'); (3) surjective: Vs E S, V(a', b') E -'; 3(a, b) E -; (a, b) zs (a', b').
Definition 3. The SFOL preorder on correspondences, noted -G -', holds if there is a double correspondence = : -+ -' such that any conflict between A and B has a corresponding conflict between A' and B', i.e. for all
Theorem 3. If two SFOL interpretations agree, they satisfy the same first-order
formulae.
(end of 3.5)
The meaning of but
The models of D but E are the models of E that are the closest to a model of D; the comparison category chosen by the language designer provides the (generalized) distance that gives the meaning of "closest".
We introduce some notations to express this formally. For formulae 0, E E 2, we define Mor( E, D) as the morphisms whose domain satisfy E and whose codomain satisfy D.
Definition 4. h is minimal among a set of morphisms S (h E Min(S)) iff:
We abbreviate
, so that we can write:
Informally, a model of D but E is the starting point of a shortest path from E to D.
Example 3.6. The sentence "all men are mortal, but Faust" can be modelled as:
We expect intuitively that the disagreement between a model A of D and a model B of E are the immortal men of B. The smallest such set will only contain Faust, so that in all models of D but E all men but Faust will be mortal.
Many uses of exceptions in linguistics are of this type: a general rule admits a number of specific exceptions.
Let us look in more detail if the informal reasoning above is valid in all our example default institutions.
l In FOL= =, we can derive Vx: man, x # Faust j mortal(x), but we cannot derive mortal(John)-assuming John is another constant of type man-unless we specify John # Faust. l In SFOL, Faust is the unique immortal man, as expected, and we can derive mortal(John).
(end of 3.6) Example 3.7. The sentence "All Mohicans are dead, but one" can be modelled as:
Once again, the disagreement will be the Mohicans that are not dead in the model of E, and the smallest disagreements are the singletons, but here the models may disagree on who is the last surviving Mohican.
(end of 3.7)
Example 3.8. Natural numbers modulo 3 are obtained as in Fig. 3 .
This supplementary law (0 = 3) contradicts the first two axioms of Nat. In SFOL, the disagreement is given by the numbers that were different in the model of Nat and now become equal. The smallest disagreement is given by the natural numbers modulo 3, N/3. Note that this example is plainly unsatisfiable in FOL==.
(end of 3.8) 
Syntax
It is often useful to be able to order not only two "sources of information", as with but, but an arbitrary number of them, with an arbitrary precedence relation. The same idea is found in [26, 31, 49, 551 . To that end we define a reliability graph for a given signature X as:
l a set S of "sources of information" (graphically represented by points);
l a well-founded partial order < s on S, where the lowest source is considered as the most reliable; l a function @ from S to formulae, representing the knowledge provided by each source.
If G is the name of the graph, we sometimes denote CD(S) by G,. 
Lexicographic ordering
The definition of a model of such a graph is the obvious extension of the definition of but, where the concept of morphism is replaced by family of morphisms. The ordering among families is "lexicographic":
More precisely, this definition extends the concept of lexicographic ordering in two directions: both the order of "string positions" (sources) and the order of "characters" (morphisms)
can be partial. When the sources are not ordered at all, the ordering of families is the usual ordering of tuples. At the opposite, when the sources are linearly ordered, we obtain the usual concept of lexicographic ordering. This extended lexicographic ordering can be found in [26, 49] , among others.
Semantics
We simply adapt the definition 
Operations on graphs
It is often useful to create new graphs by combining existing ones. We have isolated the following useful operations on graphs:
l The superposition of G over G', denoted G/G', places G above G', i.e. G is deemed less reliable than G'. This operation can be used to integrate new information taking precedence.
l The juxtaposition of G and G', denoted Gil G', places G and G' side by side. This operation can be used to integrate new information in a skeptical way.
l The replacement of a source by a subgraph, G[s:= G'], is a generalization of the previous operations: Juxtaposition is obtained by replacing the two nodes of a binary graph without precedence, and superposition by replacing the two nodes of a binary graph with a precedence link.
l The single-node operation takes a formula and makes a graph of it. This operation will be left implicit.
l The empty graph operation, 0, is included for theoretical purposes only.
We also say that a graph H has more edges than G, if sH 2 sG, and the sources and formulae are the same.
These operations extend naturally to families of morphisms. Note that these operations take into account the internal structure of graphs: Even if two graphs have the same class of models, one may not replace the other as the argument of such graphical operators. If we identify isomorphic graphs, we obtain that "1" is associative with identity 8, and "I(" is commutative and associative with identity 0. Both are monotonic with respect to "has more edges".
For any graph G, the semantics of G, denoted m or ICI, defines a class of models, just like a formula. Framed graphs can thus be used in place of formulae:
for instance, they may be combined by the usual boolean connectives.
For the same reason, framed graphs may be used inside graphs, allowing a finer treatment of precedence.
For instance, if we interpret Fig. 5 
Properties
To express concisely these properties, we assume to use a language L&(X) that contains graphs, with the semantics given by Definition 6, but also classical connectives, with their usual semantics.
Notations. D and E will denote formulae of L&(E), including formulae of the original language 3 or framed graphs. G, G,, and G, will denote graphs.
First note that our semantics allows the replacement of equivalent formulae:
Our next theorem allows us to add or remove a frame around a single formula, or said otherwise, the graph containing a single source with formula 4 has the same models as 4:
Theorem 5. m#D.
Note that Theorem 5 above would not be valid in [49] , where (II HT. Our study of but is subsumed by the study of graphs, since but is just a binary graph:
As expected, if a graph has a minimum (most reliable) source, then the models of the graph satisfy the formula of that source:
In a connected institution, Theorem 7 can be further generalized to an arbitrary subgraph instead of a single source, stating that by removing the upper part (GJ of a graph, we add models:
When we remove a frame in the bottom of a graph, we obtain a weaker formula:
If a graph is satisfiable, all its formulae are satisfiable as well:
If it is possible to satisfy all formulae of a graph at the same time, then the graph reduces to a conjunction: "Semi" means that equivalence is replaced by entailment; this reflects the fact that we are allowed to choose the closest models of C v D.
The next rule can be paraphrased as follows: assume that we can satisfy the left-hand side, namely satisfy E, and be as close as possible to G, within E,, and symmetrically.
Then we satisfy E, A EZ, and we are as close as possible to both G, and G2. Example 4.3. Another puzzle is due to [53] . Imagine a man who always wears his hat when it is raining. Now you are told that it is raining, so that you also believe that he has his hat on. Then, looking through the window, you discover that it is not raining. When modelling this story, we obtain that ((rain + hat) but rain) but Train, which evaluates to Train A hat in PL: so you still believe that the man has his hat on, just because you believed it a few seconds before. The cause of the problem is clear: we have not recorded the justification for believing hat, so that the effect persists even when the justification has disappeared. Using reliability graphs, we obtain (rain =+ hat)/rain/lrain, which evaluates to Train, as expected. Note that to represent faithfully the story, we should not insert the new data according to its temporal ordering but according to its reliability, that is (rain + hat))l( ' / ram Train). For this simple story, the result is the same.
(end of 4.3)
Related work
Although the present study was developed to fulfill our needs in structuring specifications, it is related to many fields of computer science and logic. The relation between these fields has been studied in [4, 5, 20, 25, 39, 431.
Nonmonotonic logics

Default logic
Default logic [47] seems an adequate device to model exceptions, since the inference rules of this logic include some antecedents, a consequent-as usual-but also justi$cations that must be consistent before the inference rule may be applied.
This fits with an (often unsound) intuitive meaning of D but E, "accept the consequence of D as long as they are consistent with E".
This logic has to be used with some care:
(1) The justifications have to be carefully crafted to allow the right level of granularity.
To take a trivial example, a default like Vx; p(x) can be translated to the normal defaults:
In this case p(t) will be inferred when consistent, for any term t. We will never be able to infer Vx; p(x), even if no exceptions are present. (end of 5.1)
Example 5.2. A popular example is found in [42]: normally non-broken things are usable : M(usable(x) A lbroken(x))/usable(x).
You have met a friend with a broken arm, but you don't remember which one: broken(leftarm) v broken(rightarm).
Since we can assert no formula of the form broken(x), the default can be applied in every case and we conclude both usable(leftarm) and usable(rightarm 
K*7. K * (4 A $)s CI((K * 4) A $).
K"8. If i$$ (K * 4), then CZ((K * 4) A +)G K * (4 A $).
As our approach is based on a possible world semantics, these postulates do not directly apply; nevertheless we can translate them, be replacing In summary, the postulates of [23] seem somewhat too strong. The literature contains many proposals for relaxing them (see [21] ).
The following differences are important however:
l Gardenfors [23] operates on theories: One negative consequence is that no counterfactual logic can be built by the Ramsey test on top of revision. We operate more classically on possible worlds, so that this problem does not arise. l 
Gardenfors
[23] assumes that the criteria for revision depend only, but also arbitrarily, on the knowledge under revision. In our setting, the criteria for revision depend on the underlying models, and have thus to behave more regularly.
The axiom Or1 reflects this regularity. On the other hand, this regularity might be exaggerated for modelling human belief revision (even the weaker assumptions of [23] are too restrictive (see Example 4.2)). For this purpose, we suggest to use the more flexible reliability graphs (Section 4). l 
[23] assumes that revision never introduces inconsistency (axiom K"5). Although desirable, this assumption is rarely satisfied by example institutions; among others, circumscription (or FOL==) does not satisfy it.
Circumscription
Informally, circumscription is a syntactic expression that should express that the extension of predicates is minimal.
Predicate circumscription
The earliest variant of circumscription is introduced in [37] . If T is a first-order formula, its predicate circumscription is defined as the infinite set of formulae Circum,( T, P) containing T and all instances of
T[P'] AVX(P'(X) + P(x)) + Vx(P(x) + P'(x))
where the predicates of P' are replaced by arbitrary first-order formulae. Deduction from circumscription (either this variant or most of the following) is not trivial, since it involves guessing "good" formulae to replace P'. This variant was abandoned because:
l all predicates of the signature have to be minimized, hampering thus the use of defined predicates (for instance, defining Q @ 1 P will prevent any minimization of P nor Q); l using a first-order scheme leads to incompleteness (see the example of [33] , reproduced in [41] ).
Variable circumscription
To allow some predicates to vary while others are being minimized, a simple modification is sufficient: Circum,( T, P, , 2) (where P, c P and Z G 0 u P) is defined as T and all replacements of Pi and Z' in
T[P;,Z'/P,,Z]AVX(P;(X) + P,(x))
+ Vx(P,(x) + P;(x)).
Second-order circumscription
This definition can be made more powerful by a using second-order quantification that ranges not over first-order formulae but over sets: Circum*( T, P,, Z) is
T/\VP;,Z'.(T[P:,Z']r\Vx(P;(x) + P,(x))) j
Vx(P,(x) * P:(x)).
When Z = P\P, , the models of this formula are exactly the models that are minimal for the preference ordering on models: As R iff l sA = sB, where s is the unique sort;
l fA =fe for all f e F;
l paGps for all pE P,.
This is simply the definition of D but T when D = /j\pCpI Vx.lp(x) in the default institution FOL== (see Section 3.1.2).
Formula circumscription
Formula circumscription [38] allows the minimization of a given formula E.
Formally, it is defined as follows: Circumf (T, E, P, , Z) is
TAVP'.(T[P',Z']AVX(E(P',X) + E(P,,x))) +
Vx(E(P,,x) + E(P',x)).
The intent may seem similar to the intent of D but T, with D = 1E. These approaches differ in their treatment of open variables: the open variables of E determine the granularity of the minimization, since we minimize the instances of E. On the other hand, in D but T, D can be a closed formula, since the granularity is fixed by the default institution.
We can still model formula circumscription through an indirect translation.
As indicated in [38] , the use of an arbitrary expression E above can be eliminated by introducing a fresh predicate 9 and circumscribing q in T A Vx.q(x) @ E(P, x) with P u {q} varying.
Prioritized circumscription
Prioritized circumscription [35] is an extension that can be modelled by an expression D,/. . */D,/E, with D, = /jptPZ Vx.lp(x).
Comparison
We have seen that second-order circumscription (with no functions varying) can be modelled by a but in FOL= =. The reverse is also true: D but E can be modelled by using four copies of the predicate P, say Pd, P,, Prd, Pde, where the first two represent the extension of the predicates in the models d and e, and the last two the differences between these two. We minimize thus the last two in Our definition often avoids coding tricks of circumscription, such as abnormality predicates.
It also allows one to consider default institutions, such as SFOL, that handle exceptions on equality better than FOL= =. For instance, the hypothesis of uniqueness of names, often needed in the practical applications of circumscription, can be expressed (see Section 5.4.1).
ArtiJcial intelligence
Inheritance networks with exceptions
The study of inheritance with exceptions for "semantic networks" is mainly concerned with the precedence problem, often analysed in graph-theoretic terms [8, 9, 29, 541. Our approach, based on logic, has a richer language (that includes first-order logic) but automated reasoning is less efficient.
Logic programming
Many recent contributions to this field try to give a decent meaning to negation in logic programs.
Closed world assumption
This assumption, implicit in the deduction mechanism of Prolog, is often used to model nonmonotonic reasoning [46] . This interpretation of a theory E can be modelled by D but E, where D contains ip(x) for all p E P. This expression gives the same result as the closed world assumption on Horn theories, but gives also consistent results for disjunctive theories.
Perfect models
The closed world interpretation is not always intuitive and convenient. Abettereven called perfect-class of models is proposed in [43] for ground stratified programs.
When this stratification is generated by a finite stratification, i.e. by m finite sets of literals (strata) li, the perfect models are the models of lI,/e * */1,/E in SFOL. The general case can only be treated by infinite expressions in our formalism.
Algebraic theory
Initial model
The case of equations (no other predicates, and no logical connectives) has been studied in [ 171, where they prefer the initial model, which has the properties of "no junk" (surjective) and "no confusion".
No confusion This last property can be modelled in SFOL by
where D contains AsCs Vx, y : s; x # y, and E is the equational presentation. Note that this obviously requires that the equality is not built into the institution, for otherwise D would be plainly inconsistent.
No junk
The property of "no junk" is formally represented by the constraint of term generation, which is equivalent to a second-order induction principle [36] .
To model this principle in our setting, we use an auxiliary predicate r (for "reachable") that we specify as follows:
[ Vx.lr(x) but//lo VGA r(yi) * U(y)) t I
A Vx.r(x).
Object-oriented programming languages
The philosophical ideas on which our approach is based-structuring by use of inheritance and exceptions-are also used in object-oriented programming languages using multiple inheritance with exceptions. There are important differences, however:
l For efficiency, the combination of methods is programmed by the user, while this combination is based on semantics in our approach.
l For the same reason, the search for a method often occurs in some sequential order, while our approach takes a more skeptical view.
Conclusion
This article proposes a model-theoretic definition for combining defaults and exceptions into reliability graphs, based on the idea of closeness present in the intuitive notion of exception. Our definition is parameterized by the logic used and this closeness between models that we call a default institution. One of these default institutions, SFOL, deals more satisfactorily with equality than circumscription; it is also amenable to a complete characterization in second-order logic, and to automated deduction (these topics are treated in [SO]). Defaults institutions can also be used to define conditionals (in the style of [34] ), update [30] , and forgetting
[28] operators.
Deduction rules for reliability graphs, valid in any default institution, are presented; however, they do not form a complete proof system. Our proposal has been designed, through its model-theoretic nature, to blend elegantly with the classical structuring concepts proposed by the algebraic school, but this blend has not been presented in the present paper. Finally, the practical usefulness of our proposal, and the methodological aspects of its use, have yet to be assessed through realistic experiments.
Appendix A. Definitions
A.l. Default institutions
Our definition is parameterized by a default institution, which is given by: 
A.4. Properties of defaults institutions
A default institution is: Proof. Using Theorem 1, we just have to show:
(1) The identity is an agreement between A and A, easy. 
Proof.
Reflexivity: -: A + B is less than itself using the identity as the double correspondence needed to make the comparison. Transitivity: For -: A+ B, 5': A'+ B', and -": A"+ B", if -s -' (using -) and --'< _)I (using -'), then we show that -S -' using the relational composition Z. z' 0 3 . 
Proof. First note that if d(D, E) is defined, h E Min(E, D) iff h E Mor(E, D) and h = d (0, E). By definition
of but, it suffices to show that Proof.
(*I ei= G/E e 3h E Min(G/E), dam(h) = e 3 hlc E Mar(G).
Assume hlG & Min(G).
Then Proof. First note that adding edges reduces the frontier between two families: fiH (f,f') ~fi~(f;f') but cannot void it due to well-foundedness:
3h'cGhlG, h'E Min(G) =+ dom(h') = e'!= E 3 h'lid,. < h * h& Min(G/E).
fil&f')f0 * .h(f;f')#O.
Consequently, if two families are equivalent, strictly better, or strictly worse for G, they will still be for H. If two families are incomparable, they cannot become equivalent.
Here, we only need that f'cG f + f'cHj Thus, if a family is minimal for Proof. Using (K7). 0
